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This study analyzed the relation between mental time travel (MTT) and the ability to
produce a storytelling focusing on global coherence, which is one of the most notable
characteristics of narrative discourse. As global coherence is strictly tied to the temporal
sequence of the events narrated in a story, we hypothesized that the construction
of coherent narratives would rely on the ability to mentally navigate in time. To test
such a hypothesis, we investigated the relation between one component of MTT—
namely, episodic future thinking (EFT)—and narrative production skills by comparing the
narratives uttered by 66 children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (ASD)
with those produced by 66 children with typical development. EFT was assessed by
administering a task with minimal narrative demands, whereas storytelling production
skills were assessed by administering two narrative production tasks that required
children to generate future or past episodes with respect to the target stimuli. The results
showed that EFT skills were impaired only in a subgroup of children with ASD and that
such subgroup performed significantly worse on the narrative production task than ASD
participants with high EFT skills and participants with typical development. The practical
and theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
The ability to tell stories is a species-specific feature of human beings. Niles (1999) defined
individuals of our species as Homo narrans. In a similar way, Corballis (2015, p. 107) maintained
that “if there is anything that defines our species as unique. . . it is the telling of stories, and the
invention of language as the means of doing so”. Indeed, according to several scholars, the ability
to tell stories represents the evolutionary adaptation that distinguishes humans from other animals
(Sugiyama, 2001; Thompson, 2010; McBride, 2014; Adornetti, 2015; Ferretti, 2016; Corballis, 2017;
Ferretti et al., 2017).
Defining what characterizes a narrative is a matter of controversy. There is a general agreement
on the fact that narratives do imply a reference to sequences of events in time (Scalise-Sugiyama,
2005). In the present study, we focused on a specific property of narrative and on a specific
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cognitive ability. Global coherence is the narrative property called
upon when constructing the plotline necessary to process the
gist of a story. The specific cognitive ability—Mental Time Travel
(MTT)—is the skill that allows humans to navigate in time
(Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997, 2007). From a theoretical point
of view, since global coherence is a property strictly tied to
the temporal sequence of events in a story, we argue that the
processing of that story is largely dependent on the individual’s
ability to navigate in time. From an empirical point of view, our
aim was to investigate the role of MTT in narrative by analyzing
storytelling in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), a
neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by deficits in social
communication and interaction, along with restricted repetitive
interests and behaviors (American Psychiatric Association [APA],
2013). Children with ASD are reported to have difficulties in
narrative, especially in respect to qualitative aspects, such as the
gist of the story and the organization of coherent chains of events
(see section “Narrative Global Coherence as the Construction
of Causal Chains”). Furthermore, children with ASD have
been reported to show impairments in managing the temporal
dimension of experience (see section “Episodic Memory and
Episodic Future Thinking in Autism”).
In the past, several scholars have supported the idea that
the triad of behavioral impairments characterizing ASD—social
interaction, communication, and imaginative flexible functions—
is attributable to a single cause, although there has been
disagreement as to what that cause might be. According to
the fractionable triad of autism model (Happé et al., 2006;
Happé and Ronald, 2008) the three diagnostic domains of
ASD have independent causes at the genetic, cognitive, and
neural levels. The cognitive level is particularly relevant to
account for the narrative abilities of individuals with ASD. In
this respect, the triad of behavioral impairments characterizing
ASD has been interpreted as reflecting a deficiency in three
cognitive domains: an impairment in theory of mind (e.g.,
Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Perner et al., 1989), a problem in
central coherence (e.g., Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 1997; Happé
et al., 2001), or a dysfunction in executive processes (e.g.,
Ozonoff, 1995; Robinson et al., 2009). Recently, King et al.
(2014) have suggested that the cognitive systems involved in
the triad of behavioral impairments are all engaged in the
narrative deficits of individuals with ASD (see Baron-Cohen,
1988; Bruner and Feldman, 1993; Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 2000;
Zalla et al., 2006; Nuske and Bavin, 2011; Barnes and Baron-
Cohen, 2012).
In this current study, we endorse the idea that the narrative
skills of children with ASD should be explained with reference
to multiple cognitive processes. That said, our proposal is an
integration of those models centered on the role of three single
cognitive domains: in addition to the role of theory of mind,
central coherence and executive functions, we suggest the need
to investigate the narrative deficits of individuals with ASD also
considering the crucial role of the cognitive ability that allows
individuals to travel in time. More specifically, our hypothesis
is that the proper functioning of MTT represents a constituent
condition for the generation of coherent narratives. To this
extent, we propose that the narrative deficits of individuals with
ASD might be further investigated in reference to a potential
impairment of MTT.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Narrative Global Coherence as the
Construction of Causal Chains
Scholars widely share the idea that global coherence is at the base
of the construction of relationships among events that represent a
story’s structure. Affirming that global coherence guides narrative
means that the gist of a story is closely tied to the network of
causal connections that link the events characterizing different
episodes of a story. In line with this hypothesis, Sah and Torng
(2015, p. 2) define global coherence as the “global representation
of story meaning and connectedness,” and Jolliffe and Baron-
Cohen (2000, p. 1169) regard global coherence as “the ability
to establish causal connections and interrelate local chunks into
higher-order chunks so that most linguistic elements are linked
together thematically.”
What kind of causal connections are involved in global
coherence? Several studies have analyzed stories produced by
people with ASD using the causal network model (CNM)
proposed by Trabasso et al. (1984), Trabasso and Sperry (1985),
Trabasso and Van Den Broek (1985). At the basis of the CNM are
two kinds of causal relationships: causal connections and causal
chains. Causal connections have a local character: they refer to the
overtly or non-overtly marked causal relations between pairs of
narrative events. On the contrary, the causal chains among events
have a global character, as they relate to utterances connected by
causes and consequences during the development of the story
(they consist of a sequence of events that form the gist of a
story) (Trabasso and Sperry, 1985). According to the CNM, it
is mostly through causal chains that a story’s global meaning is
given coherence as the global meaning of a narration implies
the processing of wide connections between single pieces of
information (Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 2000). From this view,
global coherence is a qualitative property characterized by a
holistic character not reducible to local connections between
pairs of events (Cosentino et al., 2013).
Consistent with the framework of investigation proposed by
the CNM, several studies have suggested that the impairments
in storytelling of individuals with ASD can be explained with
reference to a specific difficulty in identifying the causal network
of a narrative structure (Losh and Capps, 2003; King et al.,
2013, 2014; Sah and Torng, 2015). Applying the CNM to the
study of narrative in this population, Diehl et al. (2006) reported
that children with ASD obtained lower measures of causal
connections than children with typical development. However,
contrary to expectations, Diehl et al. (2006) as well as Sah and
Torng (2015) noted that children with ASD and children with
typical development were equally sensitive to the causal-chains
events of a story. From these results, it seems that the global
narrative impairments reported in ASD cannot be explained with
reference to the CNM. It is our proposal that such a model might
be extended to include the role of further aspects in addition to
the causal connections between events of a story. Indeed, since
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narrative processing is governed by the global level involved in
connecting not adjacent events, namely events that are distant in
time, a crucial role in processing coherent narratives might be
ascribed to a factor completely omitted by the CNM: the time
factor. In the next section, we will take into account such a factor
by introducing a different theoretical model.
Acknowledgment of the Time Factor in
Narrative Processing
Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (2000) have linked the narrative deficits
of global coherence in individuals with ASD to their impairments
of central coherence – a tendency to focus on details without
being able to integrate them into a wider global context (see also
Nuske and Bavin, 2011). In their experiments, the authors tested
two conditions: (1) a temporal condition in which subjects were
asked to reconstruct the correct sequence of events in a story
containing markers of time and (2) a coherence condition in
which subjects were asked to reconstruct the correct sequences
of events in a story without temporal markers. The authors
suggested that the more appropriate way to investigate the
narrative abilities of individuals with ASD is by excluding
the temporal condition, a condition that the authors consider
unimpaired. While the principle is methodologically sound, a
procedure of this kind entails two consequences. The first is
corroborating the idea that the representation of time is not
involved in the mental operations necessary to construct global
coherence. The second is taking for granted that the temporal
dimension of experience is fully accessible for people with ASD
because of their ability to use the temporal markers. However,
both these consequences are highly controversial. In this final
section we show why the representation of time appears to be
necessary for the construction of global coherence. In the Section
“Episodic Memory and Episodic Future Thinking in Autism”
we will address the issue of time representation in individuals
with ASD.
Currently, it is a much-debated question whether the
temporal dimension should be considered a condition of global
coherence. Giora and Shen (1994) maintained that the processing
of narrative requires the ability to analyze “a higher-order
organization which hierarchically connects not only adjacent
events. . . but also events which are remote from one another
on the temporal axis of a given discourse” (p. 450 emphasis
ours). Karmiloff-Smith (1985, p. 62) suggested the idea that global
coherence is the temporal/causal structure of story content.
Consistent with these considerations, we suggest that the time
factor represents an important aspect in the construction of
global coherence. At the basis of our hypothesis are some
general theoretical issues. Herman (2013), a scholar involved
both in narratology and cognitive science, referred to the
narratological tradition inspired by the work of Genette (1972; for
subsequent developments, see Ireland, 2001; Bridgeman, 2005;
Matz, 2011) and of Ricoeur [developed by Bruner (1999, 1991)
and cultural psychologists] to propose a clear idea for reflection:
the intrinsically temporal nature of narrative. Namely, Herman
(2013, p. 301) argued that “stories. . . are a primary technology
for making sense of how things unfold in time.” Similarly, Abbott
(2008, p. 3) suggested that “narrative is the principal way in which
our species organizes its understanding of time.” According to
Corballis (2015) the temporal character of narrative pertains to
the fact that telling a story implies a detachment from the present
and a projection in a time different from the here and now.
In his view, the same constructive process that allows human
beings to reconstruct the past and construct possible futures also
allows them to invent stories (Corballis, 2011). Following this
view, our idea in this current study is that among the cognitive
abilities underlying narrative coherence, we must recognize the
crucial role of temporal navigation that allows people to project
themselves backward and forward in time.
Episodic Memory, Episodic Future
Thinking and Their Relationships
As mentioned in the Introduction, mental time travel (MTT) is
the cognitive system that allows individuals to project backward
and forward in time (Tulving, 1985, 2001, 2005; Suddendorf
and Corballis, 1997, 2007). It is composed of two closely related
abilities: the ability to remember past experiences or episodic
memory (EM; Tulving, 1985, 2005) and the ability to imagine
possible future experiences, called episodic future thinking (EFT;
Atance and O’Neill, 2001, 2005; Schacter et al., 2017). EM
allows individuals to re-experience events from their own past,
while EFT allows them to pre-experience events from their own
potential future. In this sense, MTT is an ability that does not
merely reflect the extraction from memory of a specific meaning
or knowledge; rather, it involves the retrieval of previously
experienced episodes, as well as the generation of potential future
ones (Schacter and Addis, 2007).
A number of studies have recognized the existence
of important connections between EM and EFT.
Neuropsychological investigations have shown that patients with
impairments in EM have difficulties also in envisioning future
events (e.g., Klein et al., 2002). Neuroimaging studies on healthy
subjects showed that many of the same brain regions—medial
temporal and frontal lobes, posterior cingulate, and retrosplenial
cortex, as well as lateral, parietal, and temporal areas—are active
both when remembering the past and envisioning the future
(Addis et al., 2007, 2009; Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Hassabis
et al., 2007). Furthermore, developmental research has found
that EM and EFT emerge in tandem between 3 and 5 years of age
(Atance and Meltzoff, 2005; Busby and Suddendorf, 2005; Hayne
et al., 2011; Scarf et al., 2013; Atance and Sommerville, 2014).
Based on the commonalities between remembering the
past and envisioning the future, several hypotheses have been
proposed regarding the nature of MTT. Schacter and Addis
(2007) suggested the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis.
According to this hypothesis, EM supports future simulation
(construction of a specific mental representation of the future)
by allowing people to flexibly extract and recombine elements of
past experiences to generate novel scenarios. An important aspect
of this hypothesis is that remembering the past and imagining the
future both involve constructive processes. Indeed, Schacter and
Addis (2007) noted that EM does not function in a reproductive
manner, similar to a video recorder; rather it is vulnerable to
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 June 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 944
fpsyg-09-00944 June 17, 2018 Time: 12:20 # 4
Ferretti et al. Time and Narrative in ASD Children
errors and distortions. From this point of view, EM involves
conscious acts of construction. In the same way, since the future
is not an exact replication of the past, future episodes may require
a system of construction rather than reproduction. Buckner and
Carroll (2007) focused on the prospection component, suggesting
that self-projection could be the crucial common process of
both EM and EFT: the shifting perception of oneself from the
immediate environment to an alternative and imagined future
one. Hassabis and Maguire (2007), while acknowledging the
importance of self-projection for episodic memory recall and
thinking about the future, suggested that functions not explicitly
connected to the Self (e.g., imagining fictitious experiences) can
better explain commonalities in the brain areas activated by EM
and EFT tasks. Accordingly, they proposed that both EM and EFT
rest on the capacity for mental scene construction, which refers
to the generation and maintenance of coherent, multimodal
spatial representation. Specifically, scene construction involves
binding multiple elements of an imagined scene, such as
feelings, thoughts, people, and objects. Thus, according to
Hassabis and Maguire (2007, 2009) remembering/foreseeing one’s
own past/future and remembering/foreseeing someone else’s
past/future both rely on a similar scene construction process.
Similarly, Perrin and Michaelian (2017; see also Michaelian,
2016) maintained that EM and EFT do not necessarily involve
autonoetic consciousness (i.e., the preservation of the subject’s
experience of the remembered event) as both are simulational
processes that might concern either oneself or another. This point
is key to our proposal since we suggest that MTT is involved not
only in the construction of personal narratives, but also in the
construction of narratives detached from any personal experience
and which instead involve events of another (both fictitious or
real) person.
Episodic Memory and Episodic Future
Thinking in Autism
In the past few years, it has been argued that ASD offers an
ideal test to unveil the nature of MTT (Lind and Williams, 2012)
given that it is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized
by deficits in autobiographical memory, which largely relies on
EM (Klein et al., 1999; Bowler et al., 2000; Goddard et al.,
2007; Crane and Goddard, 2008). Considering this and based on
the commonalities between EM and EFT, several studies have
begun exploring the possibility that imagining the future might
be impaired in people with ASD (Jackson and Atance, 2008;
Lind and Bowler, 2010; Terrett et al., 2013; Hanson and Atance,
2014; Marini et al., 2016). Lind and Bowler (2010) interviewed
participants and asked them to detail events from a range of
periods (from “today” to “10 years ago/in 10 years”). Results
showed that adults with ASD recalled/envisioned fewer specific
events than did typical adults, and both groups performed better
in recalling past events as opposed to simulating future ones.
Terrett et al. (2013), who tested EFT in a group of children
with high-functioning ASD, obtained similar results. Marini
et al. (2016) assessed self-based and mechanical-based future
thinking in children with ASD: in tasks assessing self-based future
projection, children were asked to project themselves into the
near future. Mechanical-based tasks assessed the children’s ability
to predict the outcome of a physical transformation that did not
imply any projection of the Self. Results showed that children
with ASD had impaired EFT in both kinds of tasks as well as
more difficulty performing self-based tasks than mechanical ones.
However, it is worth noting that available experimental findings
are not entirely consistent. For example, Crane et al. (2013)
assessed EM and EFT in ASD subjects and achieved different
outcomes. They asked participants to complete a sentence aimed
at eliciting past (e.g., “I still remember well how. . .”) and future
event descriptions (e.g., “Next year, I. . .”). The results showed no
group differences in either past or future event conditions.
Overall, the results on EFT skills in people with ASD are far
from conclusive. The available investigations often included few
participants (see Jackson and Atance, 2008; Crane et al., 2013;
Hanson and Atance, 2014), which limited their statistical power
and the generalizability of their results. Furthermore, in most
cases, narrative-based measures were used to assess MTT abilities
in people with ASD. However, as previously discussed narrative
difficulties are usually present in this clinical population, even if at
different degrees. As such, the group differences in experimental
task performance might merely reflect general difficulties in
narrative rather than specific difficulties with EM and EFT
(Gaesser et al., 2011; Race et al., 2011; Addis and Schacter, 2012).
Several scholars (e.g., Lind and Williams, 2012; Terrett et al.,
2013) have acknowledged such methodological bias. To the best
of our knowledge, only one study assessing EM and EFT through
linguistic tasks could claim that diminished experimental
performance in remembering the past and imagining the future
was not merely the result of reduced general narrative ability
among participants with ASD (Lind et al., 2014). Compared to
other studies, these findings along with the specific methodology
used by the authors are of particular relevance as they allow
to rule out that impairments in EM and EFT in individuals
with ASD are related to linguistic deficits. More generally, these
findings have implications for a theoretical issue relevant to the
current investigation that concerns the relationship between time
and narrative. In contrast to a well-known tradition according
to which temporal projection is the product of narrative (e.g.,
Bruner, 1999, 1991; Dautenhahn, 2002), the study by Lind et al.
(2014) suggests that the representation of time is independent
from narrative abilities. These considerations are particularly
relevant as they pave the way for the possibility that the ability to
mentally travel in time might have effects on narrative processing.
The Present Study
In light of these considerations, the present study aimed at
investigating the relation between one component of MTT,
namely EFT, and narrative production skills by analyzing
storytelling abilities in a group of children with ASD. Specifically,
we aimed to verify (1) whether impairments of EFT could be
identified in a large cohort of children with high functioning ASD
using a task with minimal narrative demands, such as the Picture
Book Trip task adapted from Atance and Meltzoff (2005) and (2)
whether impairments in EFT affect narrative generation skills in
children with ASD. For the first point, based on the literature,
we predicted that EFT would be impaired in only some children
with ASD. Regarding the second point, based on our hypothesis
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about the relation between time and narrative, we expected that
participants with ASD with impaired EFT would have lower skills
of narrative discourse production than would those with normal
EFT abilities.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
One hundred and thirty-two Italian-speaking children aged
between 6 and 11.11 years were included in this study. They
formed two groups with comparable chronological age and IQ-
Level (see Table 1). The first group was formed by 66 children
with high functioning ASD and IQ level (as measured with
the Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices; Raven, 1938) in the
normal range recruited at the Bambino Gesù Children’s Hospital
in Rome, Italy. The gravity of their symptomatology was assessed
by administering the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule
2nd edition – ADOS-2 by Lord et al. (2013). Overall, the group
of participants with ASD had a mean gravity score of 6.07 with a
standard deviation of 1.66 ranging from 2 to 9.
The control group was formed by 66 children with typical
development (TD). All of them performed within normal range
on a series of tasks aimed at assessing their levels of non-
verbal intelligence (Raven’s Progressive Matrices; Raven, 1938)
and their verbal short-term and working memory (Non-Word
Repetition subtest of the Prove di Memoria e Apprendimento
per l’Età Evolutiva (PROMEA, Vicari, 2007); the forward and
backward digit span’s subtests of the Wechsler Scales (Wechsler,
1993)]. Furthermore, they had average school performance. In
a preliminary interview, their teachers confirmed that they had
normal cognitive and learning development. According to school
records and parents’ reports, none of them had a known history
of psychiatric or neurological disorders, learning disabilities,
hearing or visual loss.
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the Bambino Gesù Children’s Hospital
committee. The protocol was approved by the Bambino Gesù
Children’s Hospital committee. Parents released their written
informed consent to the participants of their children to the
study and to the treatment of the data in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki.
TABLE 1 | General data of the two groups of participants.
ASD (n = 66) TD (n = 66)
Age 8.14 (1.51) range: 6.00–11.07 8.23 (1.51) range: 6.00–11.11
Education 1st – 5th grade 1st – 5th grade
Gender
distribution
Males = 59 (89.0%) Males = 38 (58.0%)
IQ level 106.06 (14.34) range: 80–141 105.91 (10.95) range: 90–130
ADOS-2 gravity
index
6.07 (1.66) range: 2–9 –
Data are expressed as means, standard deviations, percentages, and ranges
where appropriate. Legend: ASD, (children with) autism spectrum disorders;
TD, (children with) typical development; ADOS-2, autism diagnostic observation
schedule 2nd edition.
Methods
The participants with diagnosis of ASD were tested at the
Bambino Gesù Children’s Hospital in Rome. The participants
with TD were tested individually at school. The tasks included
a cognitive assessment focusing on phonological short-term and
working memory, EFT skills and narrative abilities.
Assessment of Phonological Short-Term and Working
Memory
Several scholars (e.g., Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007, p. 307)
have suggested that working memory abilities are involved in
the generation of a future event. In fact, a study by Ferretti
et al. (2018) on 135 children with typical development has
shown that EFT highly correlates with measure of verbal working
memory. For these reasons, all participants were administered
tasks aimed at assessing their phonological short-term and
working memory [Digit Span forward and backward subtests of
the Wechsler (1993) Scales and the Non-Word Repetition Task of
the PROMEA; Vicari, 2007].
In the Digit Span forward task, the child is asked to repeat in
the correct order sequences of digits spoken by the examiner. The
digits range from 1 to 9 and vary in length. The number of lists
correctly repeated by the child represents the Digit Span forward
score. In the Digit Span backward task, the child is asked to repeat
each sequence in the reverse order. Finally, in the Non-Word
Repetition Task of the PROMEA the child is required to repeat a
list of 40 non-words that the examiner reads aloud hiding her/his
labial movements. Each correct answer is assigned 1 point for a
maximum of 40 correct repetitions.
Assessment of EFT: The Picture Book Trip Task
In the Picture Book Trip task adapted from Atance and Meltzoff
(2005) each child was shown, one at a time, four colored pictures
illustrating different destinations for a trip: a waterfall, a long
road in a sandy desert, a mountain view, and a rocky stream.
They were asked to describe each picture’s contents, and then
were explicitly asked to imagine themselves in the scenarios at
a future time point. For each of the four target pictures (e.g., the
long road), the experimenter showed three different photographs,
each representing a specific item that could be: (1) useful in the
target scenario (i.e., a bottle of water); (2) completely useless
in that scenario and not related to the scene (i.e., a gift), (3)
semantically primed by the scenario (i.e., a plant). The Picture
Book Trip task is a good measure of EFT as it is designed to
specifically evoke thoughts about future states of the self. For
example, if asked to imagine oneself walking down a long road in
a sandy desert, people would likely anticipate the state of thirsty.
Following the original study by Atance and Meltzoff (2005), we
selected events that did not form part of children’s daily routine
to minimize “script-based” responses, but which children are
familiar with. This suggests that they were anticipating how the
showed events could lead to the corresponding states. This claim
is strengthened by the addition of a semantically primed item
among the options that allows to exclude that the choice was
an effect of an associative link to the presented scenario. For its
robustness, the task from Atance and Meltzoff (2005) has been
used both in children with typical development (e.g., Atance and
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Jackson, 2009; Ferretti et al., 2018) and in children with ASD (e.g.,
Hanson and Atance, 2014).
Children were asked which of these items they would need
to bring with themselves (“Which of the objects portrayed in
these pictures will you need to take with you in this trip?”).
After choosing the selected item, they were invited to motivate
their answers, explaining how the selected item would be useful
in that scenario anticipating potential future needs (“Why will
you need this in your trip?”). Children received 1 point for
each item that had been correctly chosen (Identification Score,
IS). One additional point was assigned whenever they could
adequately motivate their choice showing that they had been able
to project themselves to meet a potential future need (Motivation
Score, MS). Noteworthy, in the original version of the task, the
Motivation Score was derived from a linguistic analysis of the
motivation produced by the child for his/her choice. Namely, the
child received 1 point only if (s)he included in the motivation
(1) a future term (e.g., going to, will, when) and (2) words that
explicitly referred to internal feelings. However, in Italian future
states can be expressed also with present tense (e.g., “Domani
vado a casa” “∗Tomorrow, I go home”). For this reason, in our
study, to avoid a potential linguistic bias, the motivation received
1 point if it correctly explained the choice regardless of the
linguistic form used by the child. A recent study conducted by
our group on 135 children with typical development has shown
that the Picture Book Trip task still works as a measure of EFT
also removing the criterion of future tense use as a marker of
motivation score (Ferretti et al., 2018). An EFT Composite Score
(EFT_CS) was derived by summing up these two scores (IS and
MS; maximum 8).
Assessment of Narrative Skills
The ability to generate a coherent narrative discourse was
assessed by administering two cartoon-story description
conditions adapted from Pagni (2011) and Ripamonti (2013).
Three cartoon-stories were designed to assess the children’s
ability to generate a future episode in a narrative discourse (i.e.,
its conclusion) (see Figure 1A). The remaining three were used to
assess their ability to generate a past episode (i.e., its antecedent)
(see Figure 1B). For each condition, the first cartoon-story was
used as a trial to allow children to get acquainted with the test.
In the future-generation condition, the experimenter arranged
three sheets of paper on the table: the first two sheets contained
colored drawings that portrayed the beginning of a story, while
the third was blank. The experimenter began by describing the
first picture (e.g., “Here is Mr. Mario. He is whistling as he walks
down this road”; Figure 1A). She then asked the child to describe
the second picture (e.g., “Mr. Mario fell down an open manhole”).
While pointing at the blank sheet, the experimenter eventually
asked the child to continue with the story by asking him or her,
“What will happen next?” For each story, children could talk
freely until they came to an end. If they did not finish the story,
the examiners prompted them only once with a standardized
question, “And then?”
In the past-generation task, the experimenter arranged two
sheets on the desk. The first sheet was blank but the second
contained a colored sketch. While pointing at it, the experimenter
described the scene depicted in the second drawing (e.g., “There
is a family in a garden with a dog wash tub and soapy water
everywhere. Dad and son are wet and angry. Mom and daughter
look at them amused. Their dog stares at the scene”; Figure 1B).
While pointing at the blank sheet, the experimenter eventually
asked the child to describe what could have likely happened
earlier in this story by saying, “What happened earlier?” In this
case, children were free to talk about the story until they felt they
had provided the beginning of these stories. In case they did not
finish the story, the examiners prompted them only once with a
standardized question, “And then?”
To avoid poor performance due to short-term memory
limitations, all pictures remained visible until participants
had finished their descriptions. Each story was tape-recorded
and subsequently transcribed verbatim; the transcriptions
included phonological fillers, pauses, false starts, and extraneous
utterances. These transcriptions were compared to obtain highly
reliable texts for analysis. Discrepancies were discussed and
resolved before the narratives were analyzed further. For all
tasks, only the narrative samples produced by the child after the
experimenter pointed at the blank sheets were included in the
analyses. Each narrative was segmented into utterances, and the
total number of utterances was assessed following criteria detailed
in Marini et al. (2011). Accordingly, we adopted several criteria
for utterance segmentation: acoustic, semantic, grammatical,
and phonological ones. According to the acoustic criterion an
utterance is an emission of phonemes delimited by pauses that
can be easily identified. Let’s consider the following sequence:
“this is a. . . (silent pause of 3 s) child.” In this case, since a clear
pause can be perceived between the first chunk “this is a” and
the second one “child,” the sequence can be segmented in two
distinct utterances: /This is a. . . (5 s)/child/. According to the
semantic criterion an utterance is a conceptually homogeneous
piece of information—i.e., a proposition, defined as a semantic
unit consisting of the main predicate with its arguments and
all embedded predicates and argument(s) associated with it.
Therefore, if there is not a sensible pause in the flow of speech,
utterance boundaries can be identified whenever a proposition
has been formulated and a new one is introduced. For example,
the sequence “A man is walking on the road. A flower pot
falls on his head” can be split in two distinct utterances: /A
man is walking on the road/A flower pot falls on his head/
because the second utterance introduces a new proposition.
Similar considerations can be applied to the following utterances:
/A man is walking on/He is running on the sidewalk/ where the
first proposition has not been completed and the second block
provides a reformulation of the preceding one. According to
the grammatical criterion for utterance segmentation, a block of
words is an utterance when, in absence of clear pauses (acoustic
criterion) and of propositional violations (semantic criterion),
it forms a grammatically complete sentence (eventually also
including subordinate clauses). In this case, even if long, the
sequence can be considered a single utterance, as shown in the
following example: /The man is walking on the sidewalk with
a dog that looks very nice/. Nonetheless, if the speaker utters
two coordinated sentences, these can be divided in two separate
utterances: /The man is walking on the sidewalk/and a dog is
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FIGURE 1 | Cartoon stories designed to assess narrative production. (A) Shows future-generation condition (adapted from Pagni, 2011). (B) Shows past-generation
condition (adapted from Ripamonti, 2013).
following him/. This is because the utterance count is important
for several derived measures capturing grammatical, cohesive
and coherent aspects of linguistic processing. According to the
phonological criterion if a word is interrupted (i.e., there is a
false start), then the utterance is considered abruptly interrupted
as well. For example, in the following sequence: /and she is
ca-/stroking his d-/his d-/the dog of the man/ four distinct
utterances can be identified and the first three end with a false
start (ca-, d-, d-, respectively). The segmentation procedure was
performed independently by three trained raters on 40 narratives
selected randomly. The segmentation procedures resulted in
substantial agreement, as the raters reached an inter-coder
reliability level of k > 0.91.
To evaluate the narratives’ global coherence, each utterance
was analyzed in five main aspects: elements that were included
in the pictures’ stimuli, new elements not originally included
in the pictures’ stimuli, direct causal links, indirect causal links,
and new elements without causal links. An utterance received
1 point if it contained elements (e.g., characters, objects, and
actions) already included in the pictures’ stimuli. For example,
the following utterance /il cappello rimane per terra/ (“the hat
is on the ground”) was evaluated as containing an element
already present in the stimuli (see Figure 1A). The percentage
of elements included in the pictures’ stimuli was calculated by
dividing the total number of such elements by the number of
utterances and then multiplying by 100. Higher values indicate
the child’s inability to project in time: the more the child produced
utterances describing elements contained in the picture, the more
he or she demonstrated being stuck on the image stimulus. An
utterance received 1 point if it contained new elements that
were not included in the starting pictures. As for the following
example, /va nelle fogne/ (/“he goes in the sewers”/), the utterance
received 1 point as it contained elements that were not present
in the image stimulus (see the Figure 1A). The percentage of
new elements was measured by dividing the total number of
new elements by the number of utterances and then multiplying
by 100. Higher values represent the child’s ability to project
in time. In this case, the more the child produced utterances
introducing new elements not contained in the picture, the more
(s)he demonstrated the ability to detach from the image stimulus.
Each utterance was also analyzed by considering the causal
connections it had with other utterances of the story. Two causal
connections were evaluated: direct causal links and indirect
causal links. Direct causal links were assessed as follows: an
utterance received 1 point when it had a direct causal connection
with the events illustrated in the stimuli. A causal connection
is established between a pair of events when the criterion of
necessity is satisfied (Trabasso and Sperry, 1985; Diehl et al.,
2006; Sah and Torng, 2015). Necessity was tested by using the
counterfactual argument of the form: if not A, then not B. That
is, if Event A had not happened in the story, then Event B would
not have happened. Accordingly, Event A is a cause of or a
condition for Event B, and the two events are considered causally
connected. For indirect causal links, an utterance received 1
point if it was not directly connected to the events in the images
stimuli but was connected to other sentences that the child had
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previously stated. In the following sample, /va nelle fogne/non
riesce a risalire perché è pericoloso/ e continua/ e trova una scala
per l’uscita/ (“/he goes in the sewers/he cannot get out because
it is dangerous/and he goes on/and he finds a stair to go out/”)
the first utterance was evaluated as containing a direct causal link
(as well as a new element) whereas the second, the third and the
fourth were considered as containing indirect causal links (as well
as new elements) connected to the information provided in the
previous sentence (see Figure 1A). The sum of direct and indirect
causal links was used to calculate a causal link score measured
by dividing that sum by the number of utterances and then
multiplying by 100. Higher values indicate the child’s ability to
connect episodes of the story. Our hypothesis was that temporal
projections and the ability to connect the events of a story causally
were both necessary for the generation of coherent narratives.
For this, we considered high values in new elements and causal
links as indicative of global coherence of the stories. Overall, these
two measures contributed to characterize in positive terms the
narrative global coherence.
We also looked at the errors children were producing when
telling the stories in order to have a measure of the degree of
incoherence of the narratives. Specifically, we evaluated errors
of global coherence by considering tangential and conceptually
incongruent utterances, defined in terms of utterances with new
elements without causal links. An utterance was considered
tangential when it contained a derailment in the flow of discourse
with respect to the information already provided in a preceding
utterance. Finally, an utterance was considered conceptually
incongruent when it included concepts not directly addressed
by the stimulus. For example, in the sequence “/aveva fatto
cadere il cappello via verso la casa/aveva costruito un garage/e
quindi ci aveva costruito qualcosa/” (“/He dropped the hat toward
the house/he built a garage/then, he built something/”) (see
Figure 1A) the second and the third utterances were evaluated
as conceptually incongruent and defined as utterances with new
elements without causal links. A percentage of global coherence
errors was calculated by dividing the number of global coherence
errors by the number of utterances and multiplying this value
by 100.
Coding was carried out independently by three trained coders.
Kappa coefficients assessing inter-coder reliability exceeded 0.95
for all five measures (elements included in the pictures’ stimuli,
new elements, direct causal links, indirect causal links and
new elements without causal links) on 40 narratives randomly
selected.
RESULTS
Analysis of Phonological Short-Term and
Working Memory Skills of the Two
Groups
The group-related differences on the assessment of the children’s
cognitive skills were analyzed with t-tests with group (i.e., ASD
vs. TD) as fixed factor and the two cognitive measures (i.e., scores
at the digit span forward and backward subtests of the WISC)
as dependent variables. The level of statistical significance was
set at p < 0.025 (0.05/2 dependent variables) after Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons. As shown in Table 2, the
two groups differed on their performance at the Forward Digit
Span subtest of the WISC [t(129) = −4.421; p < 0.001; Cohen’s
d = 0.78] but performed similarly at the Backward Digit Span
subtest of the WISC [t(129) =−1.135; p = 0.258; Cohen’s d = 0.20].
Analysis of Episodic Thinking and
Narrative Skills in Children With ASD and
Children With TD
As the two groups differed on their performance at the
Forward Digit Span subtest of the WISC, we aimed to assess
the presence of group-related differences on EFT considering
the potentially confounding role of phonological short-term
memory. The relationship between performance at the Forward
Digit Span task and the measures of EFT and narrative generation
was investigated by using Pearson product-moment correlation
coefficient on the whole sample of participants. Significant
positive correlations were found between the Forward Digit Span
scores, the EFT Score (r = 0.375; p < 0.001), the elements
included in the pictures’ stimuli (r = −0.204; p < 0.020), the
new elements (r = 0.380; p < 0.001), the causal links score
(r = 0.407; p < 0.001) and the percentage of global coherence
errors (r = −0.221; p < 0.012). For this reason, the group-
related differences on the assessment of the participants’ EFT
skills and the four narrative scores were analyzed by performing
a series of Univariate ANCOVAs with group (i.e., ASD vs.
TD) as fixed factor, the EFT Score, the elements included in
the pictures’ stimuli, the new elements, the causal links scores
and the percentage of global coherence errors as dependent
variables, and the participants’ performance at the Forward Digit
Span subtest of the WISC as covariate. The level of statistical
significance was set at p< 0.001 (0.05/5 dependent variables) after
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (see Table 3).
The analysis revealed that the participants with ASD scored
significantly lower than children with TD on measures assessing
EFT [F(1,127) = 29.552, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.187], the presence of
new elements [F(1,127) = 29.417, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.188], and
the causal link score [F(1,127) = 39.332, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.236].
However, the two groups did not differ on the referral to elements
portrayed in the pictures (elements included in the pictures’
TABLE 2 | Phonological short-term and working memory in the two groups of
participants.
ASD TD
M (SD) [min−max] M (SD) [min−max]
Digit forward∗ 5.80 (1.43) [3–10] 6.99 (1.63) [3–11]
Digit backward 3.49 (1.61) [0–8] 3.77 (1.19) [2–6]
Data are expressed as means, standard deviations, and ranges. ASD, (children
with) autism spectrum disorder; TD, (children with) typical development.
Asterisks (∗) show when group-related differences were significant after Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons (p < 0.025).
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TABLE 3 | Performance of the two groups on tasks assessing Episodic Future
Thinking skills and narrative scores (i.e., elements included in the pictures’ stimuli,
new elements causal links, and global coherence errors).
ASD TD
M (SD) [min−max] M (SD) [min−max]
EFT∗ 5.14 (2.01) [1–8] 7.09 (1.21) [5–8]
Elements included
in the pictures’
stimuli
16.24 (11.65) [0–50] 15.43 (6.51) [2–30]
New elements∗ 42.77 (14.49) [15–71] 58.89 (12.77) [24–87]
Causal links∗ 31.34 (14.36) [5–64] 47.39 (8.85) [22–65]
Global coherence
errors
4.76 (8.14) [0–43.84] 0.80 (3.52) [0–25.00]
Data are expressed as means, standard deviations, and ranges. ASD, (children
with) autism spectrum disorder; TD, (children with) typical development; EFT,
episodic future thinking score.
Asterisks (∗) show when group-related differences were significant after Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons. Elements included in the pictures’ stimuli:
higher values indicate the child’s inability to project in time. New elements: higher
values represent the child’s ability to project in time. Causal links: higher values
indicate the child’s ability to connect each other the episodes of the story. % Global
Coherence Errors: higher values indicate the child’s inability to establish coherent
links among the utterances that form each storytelling.
stimuli: [F(1,127) = 0.143, p = 0.706, η2p = 0.001] and in the
percentage of errors of global coherence [F(1,127) = 8.119,
p = 0.005, η2p = 0.060].
Potential group-related differences on the two narrative
conditions (i.e., past- or future-generation condition) were
explored by performing additional Univariate ANCOVAs with
group (i.e., ASD vs. TD) as fixed factor, the elements included
in the pictures’ stimuli, the new elements, the causal links scores
and the percentage of global coherence errors as dependent
variables, and the participants’ performance at the Forward
Digit Span subtest of the WISC as covariate separately for
the two narrative conditions. For each condition, the level of
statistical significance was set at p < 0.013 (0.05/4 dependent
variables) after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.
In the future-generation condition, the participants with ASD
produced fewer new elements [F(1,127) = 17.074, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.118] and causal links [F(1,127) = 29.079, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.185] than controls. However, the two groups did not
differ on the referral to elements portrayed in the pictures
[F(1,127) = 0.143, p = 0.706, η2p = 0.001] and in the percentage
of errors of global coherence [F(1,127) = 5.040, p = 0.026,
η2p = 0.038].
In the past-generation condition, the participants with ASD
produced fewer new elements [F(1,127) = 16.589, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.116], causal links [F(1,127) = 21.699, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.146]
and more errors of global coherence [F(1,127) = 6.903, p< 0.010,
η2p = 0.052]. However, the two groups did not differ on the referral
to elements portrayed in the pictures [F(1,127) = 0.016, p = 0.898,
η2p = 0.001].
In order to control for the potential difficulty of patients
with ASD more on one narrative condition (past- or future-
generation condition) than the other, a series of paired sample
t-tests were conducted for the two groups separately on the
narrative production variables (i.e., the elements included in the
pictures’ stimuli, the new elements, the causal links scores and the
percentage of global coherence errors). Also in this case, the level
of statistical significance was set at p < 0.013 (0.05/4 dependent
variables) after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.
These analyses showed the absence of any condition related
difference within this group.
Further Analysis of Narrative Skills
in ASD
In order to further explore the possibility that a subgroup
of children with ASD might experience significantly impaired
future thinking skills, the group of participants with ASD was
split in two subgroups according to their performance on the
task of EFT. As normative data for this task are currently not
available, we considered a score of 5–8 at the Picture Book Trip
task as normal as this was the range observed in the control
group. This allowed us to identify a subgroup of participants
with ASD who had low and one with high performances on
this task. This analysis revealed that 25 participants with ASD
had significant difficulties in EFT, whereas 41 of them did not
experience such difficulties. The two subgroups of individuals
with ASD and the group of typically developing children had
comparable chronological age [F(2,131) = 0.176, p = 0.839]
and IQ level [F(2,131) = 1.470, p = 0.234]. Importantly, the
two subgroups of participants with ASD did not differ in
the ADOS-2 Gravity Index either [t(63) = 0.913; p = 0.365]
(see Table 4). Finally, the three groups differed on the Digit
Span Forward ([F(2,130) = 12.044, p < 0.001]) with the two
subgroups of participants with ASD not differring from each
other on this measure (p = 0.112) but participants with lower
EFT skills and children with higher EFT skills both performing
worse than children with TD (p < 0.001, and p < 0.012,
respectively).
Potential group-related differences between the three groups
of participants (ASD children who had a good performance
on EFT task, those who had difficulties on this task and the
group of children with typical development) were assessed with
TABLE 4 | Cognitive profile of the two groups with ASD.
ASD LowEFT (n = 25) ASD HighEFT (n = 41)
M (SD) [min–max] M (SD) [min–max]
Age 8 (1.42) [6–10] 8.22 (1.57) [6–11]
IQ level 103.34 (14.19) [85–130] 108.72 (14.21) [80–141]
Ados 2 gravity index 6.30 (1.46) [3–8] 5.92 (1.78) [2–9]
Digit forward∗ 5.34 (1.23) [3–8] 6.10 (1.48) [3–10]
EFT∗ 3.07 (1.09) [1–4] 6.55 (1.10) [5–8]
Data are expressed as means, standard deviations, and ranges. ASD LowEFT,
children with ASD who did not perform well on the EFT task; ASD HighEFT,
children with ASD who performed well on the EFT task; EFT, episodic future thinking
score; ADOS-2, autism diagnostic observation schedule, 2nd edition. Please, note
that means, standard deviations and ranges of the group of children with typical
development are available in Table 3.
Asteriks (∗) show when group-related differences were significant after Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparison.
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a series of Univariate ANCOVAs with group as fixed factor, the
four narrative scores as dependent variables and performance
on the Digit Span Forward task as a covariate. The level of
statistical significance was set at p < 0.013 (0.05/4 dependent
variables) after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons
(see Table 5). Group-comparisons were performed by applying
the Least Significant Difference (LSD) t test with Bonferroni
adjustment. Significant group-related differences were found
for all of these measures: elements included in the pictures’
stimuli [F(2,130) = 9.867, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.135], new elements
[F(2,130) = 22.566, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.246], the causal link
score [F(2,130) = 30.509, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.326], and the
percentage of errors of global coherence [F(2,130) = 6.229,
p < 0.003; η2p = 0.090]. The group comparisons showed that
those ASD participants who performed lower on the Picture
Book Trip task produced more elements included in the pictures’
stimuli than participants with ASD who performed normal on
the same task (p < 0.001) who, in turn, produced the same
number of elements included in the pictures’ stimuli as control
participants (p = 0.082). Furthermore, those ASD participants
who performed lower on the Picture Book Trip task produced
fewer new elements (p < 0.007) and causal links (p < 0.001)
than participants with ASD who performed normal on the
Picture Book Trip task who scored lower than controls (all
ps< 0.001). Finally, those ASD participants who performed lower
on the Picture Book Trip task produced the same number of
global coherence errors as participants with ASD who performed
normal on the EFT task (p = 0.132) but only those who
performed lower on the Picture Book Trip task produced a
significantly higher number of such violations with respect to
controls (p < 0.002).
In order to control for the potential difficulty of the two
subgroups of patients with ASD more on one narrative condition
than the other (i.e., past- or future-generation condition), a series
of paired t-tests were conducted for the two groups separately on
the narrative production variables (i.e., the elements included in
the pictures’ stimuli, the new elements, the causal links scores
and the percentage of global coherence errors). Also in this
case, the level of statistical significance was set at p < 0.013
(0.05/4 dependent variables) after Bonferroni correction for
multiple comparisons. These analyses showed the absence of any
condition related difference for the group of participants who
performed well on the EFT task. However, those who scored
lower on that task produced significantly more new elements
(p< 0.001) and causal links (p< 0.009) on the future-generation
condition.
An Inspection of the Relationship
Between Measures of EFT and Narrative
Generation
The relationship between the measures of EFT and narrative
generation was investigated by using Pearson product-moment
correlation coefficient on the two groups of participants (children
with ASD and children with typical development).
In children with typical development, no significant
correlation was found between the measure of EFT and the
four narrative variables: elements portrayed in the pictures
(r = −0.076; p = 0.546); new elements (r = 0.040; p = 0.754);
causal links (r = 0.133; p = 0.291); global coherence errors
(r = −0.051; p = 0.685). On the contrary, in children with ASD
significant correlations were found for the EFT Score and the
number of elements included in the pictures’ stimuli (r = −0.421;
p < 0.001), the new elements (r = 0.379; p < 0.002), the causal
links’ score (r = 0.425; p < 0.001), and the percentage of errors of
global coherence (r = −0.247; p < 0.045).
A further inspection of such correlations in the two subgroups
of participants with ASD (with low or high EFT skills), showed a
different picture. Indeed, no significant correlation was found in
any of the two groups. In children with ASD and low EFT skills
the EFT Score did not correlate with the number of elements
included in the pictures’ stimuli (r = 0.001; p = 0.997), the
new elements (r = −0.020; p = 0.924), the causal links’ score
(r = −0.004; p = 0.984) or the production of errors of global
coherence (r = −0.090; p = 0.667). Similarly, in children with
ASD and high EFT skills no significant correlations were detected
between the EFT Score and the number of elements included in
the pictures’ stimuli (r = −0.197; p = 0.216), the new elements
(r = 0.180; p = 0.259), the causal links score (r = 0.200; p = 0.211),
and the percentage of global coherence errors (r = −0.140;
p = 0.381).
DISCUSSION
The current study analyzed the relation between a specific
component of MTT, namely EFT, and narrative generation
skills in a group of school-aged children with high-functioning
ASD. To avoid a potential severity bias, children with different
severity levels of autistic symptomatology were included in the
experiment. The performance of the group of children with a
diagnosis of ASD was compared to that of a group of children
with typical development matched on age, level of formal
education, and IQ. EFT was assessed by administering a task
with minimal narrative demands, whereas storytelling skills were
assessed with two tasks requiring children to generate future or
past episodes in a narrative discourse. Since our hypothesis was
that the ability to mentally project in time and the ability to
causally connect the events of a story are both involved in the
construction of global coherence, the analyses of the narratives
focused on the count of elements included in the pictures’ stimuli,
new elements introduced, causal links (both direct and indirect),
and errors of global coherence (i.e., new elements that were
tangential or incongruent with the storyline).
Regarding the first prediction of our study, the results
showed – consistent with the expectations – that EFT skills
were impaired in a subgroup of children with ASD. On the
contrary, the second prediction was only partially confirmed by
our findings. On the one hand, in children with ASD significant
correlations were found between EFT and the four narrative
measures (i.e., elements included in the pictures’ stimuli, new
elements, causal links, and errors of global coherence). On the
other hand, we did not find a correlation between EFT score
and the narrative measures when the group of ASD was split
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TABLE 5 | Narrative scores in the three groups of participants.
ASD LowEFT ASD HighEFT TD
M (SD) [min–max] M (SD) [min–max] M (SD) [min–max]
Elements included in the pictures’ stimuli∗ 22.76 (14.46) [2–50] 12.17 (7.06) [0–33] 15.43 (6.51) [2–30]
New elements∗ 35.54 (14.96) [15–71] 47.28 (12.35) [24–70] 58.89 (12.77) [24–87]
Global coherence errors∗ 6.95 (9.04) [0–43.84] 3.39 (7.32) [0–42.50] 0.80 (3.52) [0–25.00]
Causal links∗ 23.46 (13.50) [5–52] 36.26 (12.71) [5–64] 47.39 (8.85) [22–65]
ASD LowEFT, children with ASD who did not perform well on the EFT task; ASD HighEFT, children with ASD who performed well on the EFT task; TD, children with typical
development.
Asterisks (∗) show when group-related differences were significant after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparison.
into two subgroups (namely, the children with low EFT skills
and those with high EFT skills). Interestingly, however, looking
at the groups’ differences, the subgroup of children with ASD
who obtained lower scores on the EFT task generated stories
containing a higher percentage of elements included in the
pictures stimuli and fewer new elements and causal links with
respect to both ASD participants with higher EFT skills and
controls. Furthermore, the subgroup of participants with ASD
who performed lower on the EFT task produced more errors of
global coherence than controls.
When the two narrative conditions (future-generation vs.
past-generation) were considered separately, interesting group-
related differences emerged. Namely, in the past-generation
condition, the group of participants with ASD produced fewer
new elements and causal links than the group of participants
with typical development, but more errors of global coherence.
In the future-generation condition children with ASD produced
fewer new elements and causal links than controls but the
two groups did not differ both in the number of elements
included in the picture stimuli and in the percentage of errors
of global coherence. No differences were found between the
two narrative conditions in the ASD group: participants with
ASD performed equally both in past- and future-generation
condition. However, an unexpected finding is that the subgroup
of ASD with lower EFT skills performed better in the future-
generation condition. In the future-narrative task, indeed,
that subgroup produced more new elements and causal links
compared to the subgroup of ASD with higher EFT skills.
Overall, these results partially support the hypothesis of a relation
between temporal navigation skills and the ability to generate
coherent narratives. These findings have important practical and
theoretical implications.
Our results support the possibility of an impairment in
episodic foresight in children with ASD. This is in line with
the few studies assessing EFT in children with ASD (Jackson
and Atance, 2008; Terrett et al., 2013; Hanson and Atance,
2014; Marini et al., 2016). However, differing from previous
investigations because of the large cohort of children included in
the present study, our results show that not all individuals with
ASD might manifest difficulties in EFT. The possibility that EFT
is not homogeneously impaired in individuals with ASD might
explain the apparently incongruent results by Crane et al. (2013)
and, at least partly, by Hanson and Atance (2014). As mentioned
in Section “Episodic Memory and Episodic Future Thinking
in Autism,” Crane et al. (2013) did not find any group-related
difference between adults with ASD and neurotypical participants
on a sentence completion task employed to generate past and
future event descriptions. Hanson and Atance (2014) assessed
episodic foresight in children with ASD using a battery of five
EFT tasks. In that study, a group of children with ASD showed
difficulties only on some of them, namely the sequencing task
(judging the temporal distance of short- and long-term future life
events; Busby Grant and Suddendorf, 2009), the Grocery/Beach
task (reporting verbal plans for going to the grocery store and the
beach; Hudson et al., 1995), and the Picture Book task (Atance
and Meltzoff, 2005), which is similar to that used in the present
study. Hanson and Atance (2014) did not find any group-related
differences between children with ASD and children with typical
development on the Tomorrow task (explaining what they will
and will not be doing tomorrow; Busby and Suddendorf, 2005)
or the Zoo task (placing a toy camera in a zoo setup, making
inferences using temporal order information; McColgan and
McCormack, 2008). The absence of differences in some tasks
might depend on a methodological bias but also on the inclusion
of a heterogeneous group of ASD participants containing both
impaired and normal EFT skills.
The second relevant finding of our study was that the whole
group of children with ASD produced less coherent narratives
than the group of children with typical development. This is
consistent with other investigations reporting impaired narrative
skills in individuals with ASD, mainly regarding the qualitative
aspects of a story. Indeed, from a quantitative point of view (e.g.,
narrative length, structure, and complexity), the narratives of
individuals with ASD showed few differences compared to the
stories produced by individuals in control groups (e.g., Loveland
et al., 1990; Norbury and Bishop, 2003; Diehl et al., 2006). On
the contrary, from a qualitative point of view (e.g., representation
of the gist of the story and organization of coherent chains
of events), differences were more noticeable (e.g., Baron-Cohen
et al., 1986; Loveland et al., 1990; Losh and Capps, 2003; Barnes
and Baron-Cohen, 2012). For example, Sah and Torng (2015)
found that stories of children with ASD did not differ from those
of a control group on basic narrative measures, such as narrative
length and variety of words. However, when stories were analyzed
from a qualitative point of view, the narratives of children with
ASD were less causally connected and less coherent. Consistently,
our results show that when narratives are assessed from a
qualitative point of view (e.g., focusing on the ability to relate a set
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of events sequentially organized in time), individuals with ASD
tend to produce less coherent narratives than the control group.
A similar result was found also when the two narrative conditions
(i.e., past- and future-generation) were analyzed separately. The
group of participants with ASD produced fewer new elements
and causal links both in the past-condition and future-condition:
their ability to construct coherently organized narratives was
similarly impaired both when they were asked to generate a
past-oriented and a future-oriented story. Moreover, the analyses
showed the absence of any condition related difference within the
group of ASD. A result of this kind suggests that children with
ASD may show a core problem in the generation of narrative
independently from the specific temporal orientation (i.e., past
or future). This observation could be consistent with those
hypotheses that link the ability to remember/foresee past/future
events to a similar construction process (Hassabis and Maguire,
2007, 2009). However, further findings of the current study
suggest that past and future constructions might not completely
overlap. In fact, in the past-condition the group of ASD generated
more errors of global coherence than in the future-condition.
With regard to the specific task employed in the present study,
producing past-oriented stories appeared to be more difficult for
this clinical population. A similar difference in the two narrative
conditions was observed also when the two subgroups of children
with ASD were analyzed separately. The participants with ASD
with lower EFT skills produced more new elements and causal
links in the future-condition compared to the past-condition.
This represents an unexpected finding. In fact, several studies
suggested that in neurotypical population imagining future
events is more cognitively effortful than remembering past events
(see Perrin and Michaelian, 2017, p. 229). For example, Okuda
et al. (2003) reported greater activity in left parahippocampal
areas during tasks assessing EFT than in tasks assessing EM
and related such result to the fact that thinking about future
events requires a significant reactivation of episodic experiences
that need to be recombined in order to construct a meaningful
future episode. Similarly, when it comes to individuals with ASD
Lind and Bowler (2010) found that adults with such disorder
performed better in recalling past events as opposed to simulating
future ones. For this, the unexpected result we found is worthy
being investigated in future research.
Interestingly, the narrative measures in the whole group of
children with ASD correlated with the scores they obtained on
the Picture Book Trip task. This finding is particularly relevant
as allows to maintain that the ability to project in time plays
a role in the narrative skills of this group. Whilst this result
supports our general hypothesis of a relation between time and
narrative, the specific prediction that the performance on the
narrative task of participants with ASD with impaired EFT would
have been correlated with the score on the Picture Book Trip
task was not confirmed. When we considered the two subgroups
of children with ASD separately, indeed, we did not find a
correlation between the narrative variables and the EFT score. It
is worthy highlighting, however, that we noticed an interesting
trend suggesting that a relation between temporal representation
and narrative is in place: the subgroup of ASD who obtained
lower scores on the EFT task performed significantly worse on
the narratives measures than the group of participants with ASD
with higher EFT skills or the group of participants with typical
development. More specifically, the subgroup of children with
ASD with impaired EFT skills produced narratives with fewer
new elements and causal links. Therefore, this might indicate that
the group of participants with ASD showing low EFT skills was
less efficient in detaching from the images while constructing new
detailed and connected episodes of the stories.
Our findings suggest that the idea that the cognitive systems
involved in temporal projection might play a role in the
processing of narrative coherence is still plausible. To this
regard, the results of our behavioral outcomes are consistent with
those of a neuropsychological study conducted by Race et al.
(2015) examining the discourse of amnesic patients with medial
temporal lobe damage. In that study, the authors showed that
the hippocampus, one of the brain structure crucially involved
in temporal projection (see Addis and Schacter, 2012; Corballis,
2015), supports the integration of narrative elements into
coherent discourse when constructing complex verbal accounts.
In this perspective, the time factor might represent one of the
elements characterizing the processing of global coherence. In
fact, it should be noted that the processing of narrative is a
complex and multifaceted ability that rests on several intertwined
cognitive components. Among others, a leading role is played
by the ability to think imaginatively (Oatley, 2011). As reduced
imagination has been reported in individuals with ASD (e.g.,
Craig and Baron-Cohen, 1999; Crespi et al., 2016), it is likely that
some of their impairments in the narrative domain as well as in
temporal projection can be affected by such a difficulty in imaging
novel events. However, the specific narrative task used in the
current study required not only to imagine novel events but also
to process sequences of events by creating causal and temporal
connections between them. This represents a crucial point. While
imagination per se does not have an inherent temporal character,
our task specifically elicited a temporal form of imagination.
The specific constraints of the current narrative task, namely
the requirement to create novel events, lead to a further issue.
Many investigations aimed at analyzing the narrative abilities in
individuals with ASD (e.g., Tager-Flusberg, 1995; Tager-Flusberg
and Sullivan, 1995; Capps et al., 2000; Losh and Capps, 2003;
Norbury and Bishop, 2003; Sah and Torng, 2015) used picture
sequences such as the wordless picture story books, e.g., Frog,
where are you (Mayer, 1969) and Frog on his own (Mayer, 1973).
In these investigations, participants were shown a sequence of
pictures and were asked to tell a story based on this. However,
several studies have shown that having the aid of looking at
the sequence of pictures reduces the cognitive demands of
storytelling for the participants, and therefore increases the
length and complexity of narratives (e.g., Crais and Lorch,
1994; Gummersall and Strong, 1999). Furthermore, in generating
a narrative based on a sequence of pictures, the narrator is
required to understand the images and recognize the need
to provide a sequenced interpretation of them (Stirling et al.,
2014). For this reason, the wordless picture story book can be
mainly considered as a comprehension task, with the narrative
generation being a byproduct of the understanding of the
pictures. Instead, in the narrative task used in the current study
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the participant is required to construct a novel creative story,
with two additional constraints, i.e., generating past and future
oriented stories. For these reasons, the current tasks require
additional demands than the wordless picture story books.
Overall, these considerations have implications for a more
general theoretical issue. The idea underlying the present work
is that the time factor (i.e., the human ability to mentally
project backward and forward in time) represents one of the
abilities involved in the processing of global coherence—the
property responsible for the construction of the plotline of
a story. The relation between time and narrative has been
widely investigated in Bruner’s cultural psychology (Bruner,
1999, 1991). From Bruner’s perspective, the main idea is
that temporal projections are the product (rather than the
condition) of narrative. Following Bruner, Dautenhahn (2002,
p. 107) maintained that narrative allows humans to extend their
temporal horizon, allowing them to travel forward and back in
time. In a perspective of this kind, narrative and language are
strictly tied to each other. Several scholars who adhere to Bruner’s
psychology also adhere to the language-first hypothesis (Scalise-
Sugiyama, 2005; Hutto, 2007; Gallagher and Hutto, 2008), the
idea that language represents the constitutive element (and the
evolutionary precondition) of narrative. From this perspective,
temporal projection relies on narrative, that is, the ability to
mentally travel in time is considered the product of language,
the result of its grammatical complexity. This cultural psychology
tradition has also influenced research on narrative in individuals
with ASD. Quoting Bruner (1991), Losh and Capps (2003; Capps
et al., 2000) suggested that narrative impairments of children with
ASD were due to their poor grammatical skills, specifically with
their difficulty to manage the complexity of syntax. According to
the authors, this difficulty had effects on the narrative level, given
that “the use of complex syntax is an important linguistic tool
that enables narrators to mark temporal and causal distinctions
between story events” (Capps et al., 2000, p. 201).
The idea that global coherence could be explained in reference
to grammatical elements—that coherence can be reduced to
cohesion—has been proposed by many scholars (Halliday and
Hasan, 1976; Reinhart, 1980; see for a criticism Giora, 1985;
Cosentino et al., 2013). In opposition to this idea, our view is
that global coherence is primarily a cognitive phenomenon rather
than a linguistic one. Indeed, as Givon (1995) suggested, global
coherence is a mental phenomenon strongly tied to narrative
production and comprehension processes. In the light of these
considerations, we maintain that if the time factor represents one
of the elements characterizing the processing of global coherence,
then the processing of narrative has to be connected to the human
ability to project backward and forward in time. The results
of the present study suggest that such an ability is involved in
the construction of a story’s plotline. Therefore, contrary to the
Bruner tradition (Bruner, 1991, 1999; Dautenhahn, 2002), such
results lead us to maintain that narrative is the product, rather
than the condition, of the ability to mentally travel in time.
CONCLUSION
The results of this study lead us to believe that the difficulties in
storytelling shown by children with ASD are partly tied to their
inability to mentally project in time. In light of these findings, it
is possible to propose an integration of the fractionable model
advanced to account for the narrative deficits of individuals
with ASD. In addition to the impairments of theory of mind,
central coherence and executive functions, the narrative patterns
of individuals with ASD can be interpreted also with regard
to an impairment in the ability to mentally travel in time.
However, it is worth noting that other abilities might be involved
in the processing of narrative, including more general skills as
imagination. The specific contribution of such skills in narrative
construction deserves to be investigated in future studies. The
general conclusion drawn from these data is that the ability to tell
stories relies on cognition more than cognition relies on language.
In this sense, it is certainly true that, through stories, humans
can extend themselves in the time and space dimensions, but it
is primarily true that without the time navigation capabilities,
humans could never have had the ability to tell stories.
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